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Institutions of Restraint: The Missing 




Governance and Institutions are not ends in themselves but it is well known by 
now that good governance and effectively functioning institutions are required, along 
with sensible policies and well designed public investment, to improve resource 
allocation and comparative advantage, enhance productivity, facilitate more efficient 
markets and distribute the benefits of growth more equitably in any economy. 
How do Governance and Institutions interact? Governance refers to the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and 
social resources. Good governance requires checks and balances in a country’s 
institutional infrastructure, such that politicians and bureaucrats have the flexibility to 
pursue the common good, while restraining arbitrary action and corruption. The 
state’s monopoly on coercion, coupled with access to information not available to the 
general public, creates opportunities for public officials to promote their own 
interests, or those of friends or allies, at the expense of general interest. The 
probabilities for rent seeking and corruption are considerable. 
A variety of institutional mechanisms can provide the checks and balances that 
will lead to good governance and reduced corruption. To be enduring and  credible, 
these mechanisms need to be anchored in core state institutions. Power can be 
divided horizontally among judiciary, the legislative and the executive, and vertically 
between central, provincial and local authorities. 
Beyond the institutions within the state structure, voice and participation from 
civil society e.g. vigilant NGOs and watchdog bodies, independent but impartial media, 
user participation surveys, public dissemination of governance benchmarks—can exert 
external pressures for better government performance and reduced corruption. 
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In addition to formal institutions, informal institutions also exist and in many 
instances are equally powerful. Examples of informal institutions are trust, values 
and norms. Trust has been found to play a positive role in the functioning of large 
public and private organisations while political norms usually constrain the 
behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats. 
The main functions of the public sector institutions can be classified into three 
broad categories—policy-making, service delivery and oversight and accountability. 
This paper does not cover the policy-making and service delivery aspects of the 
public sector but focuses on oversight and accountability functions. Together with 
the voice and participation from civil society (through NGOs and watchdog bodies, 
independent but impartial media academics, researchers, thinks tanks and 
professional bodies) and external bodies to which Pakistan belongs (UN, World 
Bank, IMF, WTO etc.) these institutions of oversight and accountability in public 
sector are lumped together as institutions of restraint. 
The term “institutions” needs to be defined more precisely so that the 
subsequent discussion is better focussed. We adopt the definition used by “new 
institutional economics”. Institutions are rules that shape the behaviour of 
organisations and individuals in a society. They can be formal (Constitutions, Laws, 
regulations, contracts, internal procedures) or informal (trust, values and norms). For 
economic analysis, it is useful to distinguish between two sets of institutions: markets 
and hierarchies. Markets are a set of institutions that set the stage for conducting 
discrete and impersonal transactions, without requiring continuous contractual 
relationship. Hierarchies are sets of rules for making transactions based on vertical 
lines of decision-making authority. They are distinct from organisations which are set 
of actors who collectively pursue common objectives. Institutions constitute the 
incentive structure for the behaviour of organisations and individuals. 
This paper addresses five set of questions: (a) Why do institutions matter? (b) 
How do we measure ‘Governance’? (c) How does Governance measure up in 
Pakistan? (d) What are the institutions that can make the difference in improving 
governance in Pakistan? (e) How can we strengthen these institutions of restraint? 
 
WHY DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? 
Recent empirical research aimed at isolating the factors affecting economic 
growth and development have come up with a number of interesting results. Cross- 
country regressions on growth, popularised by economists such as Robert Barro, 
have made use of availability of large data sets as well as information on new 
variables which were not always considered relevant by economists. This new 
research has focussed on the influence of political—institutional variables, social 
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and broadens our understanding about the development process. Some of these facts 
are beyond the policy prescriptions which economists are so fond of and fall in the 
realm of other social scientists and political leader but there are yet a number of 
institutional factors which are amenable to change. 
Alesina’s survey of literature (1997)
1 indicates that four sets of political 
institutional variables have been used in cross-country regressions on growth: (i) 
variables capturing the quality of government and institutions such as measures of 
corruption; (ii) protection of property rights and enforcement of contacts; (iii) 
institutional variables, such as whether the country is a democracy or not; (iv) the 
socio-economic characteristics of the country such as initial income inequality and 
ethnic or religious composition. 
Many of these political-institutional variables appear to be highly co-related. 
According to Alesina, one possible interpretation of this observation is that good 
things go together—that political stability, an efficient bureaucracy, and low levels of 
corruption are positively associated. Second, many good institutional features are 
strongly co-related with per capita income. Good institutions facilitate growth, and at 
higher income levels it is easier to maintain political stability and efficient 
institutions. 
When the values of many political-institutional variables are compared for the 
ten slowest and ten fastest growing economies in the sample the results are striking. 
The ten slowest-growing economies tend to be more ethnically fractionalised and 
more politically unstable. They also tend to have much poorer indicators of the rule 
of law and institutional quality, much higher black market premiums and greater 
income inequality. 
Among the variables measuring political instability, variables measuring 
government fragility (frequency of government changes and coup d’etats) and 
variables sociopolitical instability (political assassinations, riots and revolutions) can 
be distinguished. 
Alesina et al. (1996)
2 suggest that a much better way to measure the effect of 
uncertainty about government survival is not the actual occurrence of a government 
change but the uncertainty in expectations caused by the underlying probability of a 
government collapse. Following this procedure they find that government fragility 
has a negative effect on growth. 
The variables measuring social conflict, such as assassinations, demonstrations 
and strikes, tend to be significant: more instability is harmful for growth. An index of 
sociopolitical instability is empirically found to have a negative effect on growth; 
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more instability reduces investment. A plausible interpretation is that political 
instability creates uncertainty and undermines investor confidence for two reasons. 
First, frequent government changes may make the policy environment unstable, 
leading to policy uncertainty. Second, sings of even more extreme instability may 
threaten property rights, leading to even more acute loss of investor confidence. 
The results on bureaucratic quality, rule of law and corruption are very clear 
and strong. All these variables are strongly significant indicating that weak 
institutions have strong and significantly negative effects on growth. Rodrik (1997)
3 
convincingly shows that bureaucratic quality explains much of the difference 
between the most successful and least successful East Asian economies. 
Bureaucratic inefficiency and institutional quality influence growth for several 
reasons. Inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies require lengthy and expensive 
procedures for opening business, which may reduce foreign investment and channel 
domestic investment toward the underground economy. An inefficient bureaucracy 
also provides a low level of productive public goods for given levels of taxation. And 
for enforcement of the law, especially poor enforcement of contracts, make 
investment activities costly, uncertain and risky for domestic and foreign investors. 
Mauro (1998)
4 presents evidence that corruption not only reduces private 
investment but also worsens the composition of public expenditure. For example he 
finds a negative and significant relationship between corruption and government 
expenditure on  education. As educational attainment is an important determinant of 
economic growth this finding is a cause for concern. 
In an earlier study
5 Mauro had estimated that an improvement in the 
corruption index was associated with an increase in the investment rate by 2.9 
percent of GDP. Similarly, an improvement in the bureaucratic efficiency index is 
associated with increase in the investment rate by 4.75 percent of GDP. As 
investment is a robust determinant of growth, corruption lowers economic growth. 
Mauro confirms this link between corruption and growth and estimates that an 
improvement in the corruption index is associated with a 1.3 percentage point 
increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. 
As institutional efficiency persists over time, bad institutions play a 
considerable role in bringing about low economic growth, thus leading to poverty. 
Many developing countries offer substantial tax incentives to lure foreign 
investors to locate in their countries. Wei (1998)
6 found evidence that corruption 
discourages foreign investment. He has estimated that if India could reduce its 
 
3 Rodrik, D. (1997) “TFPG Controversies, Institutions and Economic Performance in East Asia”. 
Cambridge, Mass. NBER. (NBER Working Paper 5914.) 
4Mauro, P. (1998) “Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure”. Journal of Public 
Economics 69:  263–279. 
5Mauro, P. (1995) “Corruption and Growth”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110:3  681–712. 
6Wei, S. (1998) “How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?” Cambridge, Mass. NBER 
(NBER Working Paper 6030.) Institutions and Governance  515 
corruption level to the Singapore level, its effect in attracting foreign investment 
would be the same as reducing its marginal corporate tax rate by 22 percentage 
points. His research suggests that developing countries would have attracted as much 
or even more foreign investment without any tax incentive if they could get domestic 
corruption under control. 
Keefer and Knack (1996)
7 find that measures of social capital and trust using 
data from surveys of individual attitudes are positively and significantly associated 
with growth. They find that trust and civic norms are stronger in nations with 
institutions that restrain predatory actions of Chief Executives. They argue that 
economic activities that require some agents to rely on the future actions of others are 
accomplished at lower cost in higher trust environments. Individuals in high-trust 
societies are also likely to divert fewer resources to protecting themselves—through 
tax payments, bribes and private security services—from unlawful violations of 
property rights. Low trust can also discourage innovation. If entrepreneurs must 
devote more time to monitoring possible malfeasance by partners, employees and 
supplies, they have less time to devote to innovation in new products or process. 
Government officials in societies with higher trust may be perceived as more 
trustworthy, and their policy pronouncements as thus being more credible. To the extent 
that this is true, trust also triggers greater investment and other economic activity. 
Promises by central bankers that they will not raise interest rates, assurances by 
ministries of finance that a nominal exchange rate anchor will remain fixed and 
guarantees that tax legislation will not be rapidly amended are all likely to be more  
credible in societies where people trust each other more. As a consequence, in such 
societies people adopt more appropriate horizons in making investment decisions, and 
choose production technologies that are optional over the long, rather than short, run. 
Borner, Bruvetti and Weder (1995)
8 use survey data to assess directly the 
credibility of the policy environment and of contract enforcement and conclude that 
these variables measuring institutional quality are very important. 
Commander, Davoodi and Lee (1997),
9 using a large data set, have come to the 
conclusion that it would take 22 years for a country with a small government and good 
institutions to double its per capita income, whereas it would take 239 years for a 
country with a large government and weak institutions to do the same. 
Cross-country evidence shows that the issues of Voice, Participation and 
Influence do not only affect equity but have an impact on the overall efficiency of  
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projects and economic growth. A functioning legal system enhances investment and 
hence employment opportunities and thus supports overall economic expansion but if 
designed and monitored by those affected by the system it can also provide security to 
the poor and empower the poor vis-à-vis the local power structures. 
The most revealing evidence about the relationship between Governance and 
Poverty Reduction has come from the recent studies on the Voice of Poor.
10 The poor 
are emphatic in their grievances against the extortion, harassment and humiliation at the 
hands of the Police and other state functionaries. They believe that they are powerless 
vis-à-vis the high handed and arbitrary behaviour of the state organs and this 
powerlessness is one of the dimensions of their continued poverty. 
To sum up, well functioning institutions do affect economic growth and 
distribution through a variety of channels: 
 (a)  The  predictability,  transparency, enforcement of contracts, efficient and 
honest bureaucracy and tax collection facilitate inflow of foreign 
investment and discourage domestic investment from flowing into the 
underground economy. 
  (b) A reduction in the incidence of corruption is associated with an increase in 
the rate of per capita growth. 
  (c) Presence of trust and social capital help reduce transaction costs and avoid 
diversion of resources towards security and protection of life and property. 
  (d) Strong and inclusive institutions reach out to the poor segments of the 
population and assist them in the delivery of basic social services. 
 
HOW DO WE MEASURE “GOVERNANCE”? 
The recent empirical literature on the subject has relied on a number of subjective 
and objective indicators of the quality of institutions. The subjective indicators are in fact 
indicators of perception derived from surveys of international and domestic  interests or 
from international political and economic consultants who deal with the business in these 
countries. The respondents answer to a variety of questions relating to governance on a 
categorical scale and those are then presented as average ratings for the country. The 
quality of those country ratings, of course depends largely on the knowledge and biases 
of the respondents. Objective indicators deal with the legal system, tax administration etc. 
These are very few examples of robust objective indicators. 
Kaufman et al.
11 have recently made an attempt to develop aggregate governance 
indicators for a large set of countries. They have used six clusters of indicators and 
grouped them under three categories: (a) the process by which governments are 
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selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. 
The indicators under the first category consist of two clusters: voice and 
accountability; political instability and violence. Capacity of government category 
include government effectiveness and regulatory burden while the third category is 
comprised of Rule of Law and Corruption. 
The components under each one of these clusters of aggregate governance 




Voice and Accountability 
 *  Political  Process 
 *  Civil  Liberties 
 *  Political  Rights 
 *  Media  Independence 
 *  Civil  Society 
Political Instability 
  *  Change in Government 
 *  Armed  Conflict 
 *  Social  Unrest 
 *  Terrorism 
 *  Ethnic  Tensions 
Government Effectiveness 
  *  Quality of Public Service Provision 
  *  Quality of Bureaucracy 
 *  Competence  of  Civil Servants 
  *  Independence of the Civil Service from Political Pressure 
  *  Credibility of the Government to Policies 
Regulatory Burden 
  *  Wage Price Controls 
  *  Independent Bank Supervision 
  *  Executive Regulation in Foreign Trade and Business Development 
  *  Government Intervention in Economy 
  *  Restriction on Ownership 
  *  Foreign Currency Regulations 
Rule of Law 
  *  Incidents of Crime 
  *  Independence and Effectiveness of the Judiciary 
  *  Enforceability of Contract 
  *  Law and Order 
  *  Security of Property Rights 
  *  Crime and Theft 
  *  Extent of Tax Evasion etc. 
Corruption 
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A number of sources cover governance data for a large sample of developed and 
developing countries. These are EIU, DRI, Heritage Foundation—WSJ, PRS and 
WDR. The choice of indicators is thus driven by the availability of data. 
 
HOW DOES GOVERNANCE MEASURE UP IN PAKISTAN? 
Despite the limitations of data and subjective nature of the governance indicators 
this paper attempts to assemble at one place all the existing information on these 
indicators as they relate to Pakistan. As they are based on a variety of different sources 
and lack a uniform and standardised definition they should not be taken as precise 
measures but more as broad indicators of magnitude. Where possible, comparative 
indicators for the other countries in the region are provided to assess the relative 
position of Pakistan. Table 2 below presents the information on the measures of 
governance collected by a variety of international sources. 
 
Table 2 
Measures of Governance in Pakistan 
        Score  Source 
(1) Bureaucratic Quality  1998  3.5  ICRG
1 
(2) Corruption  1998  3.5  -do- 
(3) Law and Order  1998  3.0  -do- 
(4) Protection of Property Rights  1998  3.0  Heritage
2 
(5) Government Intervention Index  1998  3.5  -do- 
(6) Wage and Price Controls  1998  3.5  -do- 
(7) Trade Policy Index  1998  6.0  -do- 
(8) Regulation  1997  4.0  Heritage 
(9) Black Market  1997  3 +  -do- 
(10) Country Credit Rating  1998  18.6  Euromoney
3 
Notes:  (1) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) assesses three  categories of risk: political, financial and 
economic. The higher the rating the lower the risk. 
  (2) Heritage index has values 1 to 5. The higher the score the more government interference in the 
economy and thus low scales represent good governance.  
 
An important and rich source of comparative data on key governance indicators 
is the 1999 Human Development Report on South Asia.
12 Table 3 draws on these 
indicators to present Pakistan relative to other South Asian countries which is not much 
of a satisfaction as the state of governance in the region is generally weak. The Human 
Development Report has introduced a new concept of Humane Governance Index 
(HGI) which is a composite index of  indicators measuring economic, political and civic  
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Table 3 
Comparative Indicators of Governance 
Indicator Pakistan  India  Bangladesh  Sri  Lanka 
Humane Governance Index  0.502  0.577  0.462  0.465 
Composite ICRG Risk Rating 1998  53.8  64.8  62.3  63.3 
Institutional Investor Rating 1998  25.3  44.9  26.1  32.5 
Corruption Ranking 1998  14  18  4  – 
Bureaucratic Efficiency Index  4.3  5.5  4.7  6.7 
Index of Efficiency of Judiciary  5.0  8.0  6.0  7.0 
Size of Black Economy (% of GDP)  50  35  30  25 
Right of Information Act  No  No  Yes  No 
Independent Newspapers  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Source: Human Development in South Asia 1999: (Islamabad: Mahbub-ul-Haque Human Development 
Centre, 1999). 
   
governance. Using the HGI for South Asia as the benchmark, Pakistan fares lower than 
the value of 0.56 for South Asia and 0.65 for East Asia. It ranks below India but above 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in this region. Among the fifty eight industrial and developing 
countries for which the HGI has been constructed Pakistan ranks 52nd and is seventh 
from bottom of the list.   
The above indicators simply confirm what is already known quite widely that the 
current state of governance and institutional development in Pakistan is fairly weak. The 
overall country rating is lower than India and the credit rating for the country as derived 
by Euromoney and Institutional Investor has declined significantly over last ten years. 
Besides the HDR 1999 one of the few empirical studies of corruption in Pakistan 
was carried out by Khattak, Shafiur Rehman and Shafqat
13 for the UNDP. The main 
findings of the study based on a set of interviews and review of literature were that there 
was a perceptible increase in corruption among bureaucrats. Poor pay structure, cultural 
considerations (e.g. nepotism), the phenomena of “speed money” and the willingness of 
clients to bribe were identified as the principal causes for corruption. As with the civil 
bureaucracy, “poorly paid and overworked judges, magistrates and court officials are left 
vulnerable to offers of bribery or misuse of patronage, preferential treatment, as well as 
intimidation, terrorism, assault by opponents to the judiciary”. The study found that there 
were rules, procedures and institutions to combat and counter corruption in Pakistan and 
theoretically the instruments of accountability do exist but their enactment is sporadic and 
weakly coordinated because power politics, as opposed to a strict adherence to legal 
principles guide their workings. 
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A 1995 World Bank consultant survey of 200 small, medium and large business 
firms in manufacturing and commerce
14 found that corruption was one of the four major 
constraints on their operations as perceived by the respondents. Seventy eight percent of 
the surveyed firms had paid bribes to public officials mainly in the income tax, labour, 
customs and excise/sales departments. A survey of 6,020 rural households carried out in 
1996-97 revealed that 95 recipients of loans from banks out of 219 had paid bribes in 
exchange for loan approval.
15  The average amount paid as bribes was 3.5 percent of the 
loan amount. 
There is a strong tendency among many observers and commentators in Pakistan 
to either be too dismissive of everything across the board or too defensive. The job of 
an analyst is to provide an objective and balanced assessment of both the positive and 
negative factors. But, unfortunately in our country such an assessment does not make 
headlines in the newspapers and does not command large following among the 
readership such as a number of our popular columnists do. But irrespective of this 
growing trend it would be highly inadvisable if our academics and research also yield to 
this temptation and fall in the trap of earning cheap popularity at the expense of 
informed, fact based, rigorous examination of issues. As it is, there are very few well 
established and well known economists and social scientists of international repute 
among the Pakistanis. It will be suicidal for scholarship if the younger generation of 
scholars also adopts as their role models either the prophets of gloom and doom who 
find fault with everything in Pakistan and are always enamoured by the mirages of 
greener pastures everywhere else or the coterie of sycophants and courtiers who lack the 
courage to tell the truth to their political masters. In making its findings and conclusions 
known, the analyst should divulge his biases or pre-conceived notions, the methodology 
and framework of analysis. This is particularly true for the study of governance where 
objective and quantifiable measures are scarce to begin with. 
It is in this spirit that I wish to present a balance sheet of accomplishments and 
failures in the area of Governance and Institutional Development in Pakistan. Let me 
begin by outlining the methodology and the framework of analysis used in this paper. 
There are three yardsticks which can be employed to judge the progress (a) 
change over time (b) absolute measure against expectations or specified targets (c) 
relative to other peer group of countries. What are the indicators we have chosen to 
measure progress or lack of it? As described in the earlier section there are six sets of 
indicators which are found to be empirically correlated with good governance (Table 1). 
The same six indicators are applied in this study. 
In making this presentation today I would like to supplement the published 
 
14Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption in Pakistan: Causes and Cure” (A background note for 
Pakistan 2010 study of the World Bank, 1996). 
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research and data on these indicators with my own subjective and qualitative assessment 
based on informed but casual empiricism. This empiricism is derived from a careful and 
continuous study of the situation in Pakistan, informal contacts and conversations with a 
wide ranging group of businessmen, politicians, civil servants, academics, media, 
NGOs in Pakistan. The knowledge thus acquired is situated in the context of other 
developing countries with which I have either been professionally involved or have 
studied over the last 20 years. It is further augmented by systematic literature survey. I 
offer these assessments as working hypotheses to elicit reactions and provoke further 
debate on this subject so that we can have a solid empirical basis for subsequent work. 
The ideal situation would be to carry out systematic diagnostic surveys as has been 
done in many countries and test these hypotheses. I hope this can be done sometime in 
the future. 
 
(i)  Voice and Accountability 
The overall impression about this indicator is that there have been improvements in 
the “Vice” but only modest beginning in the “Accountability” part of this measure. 
Independent and fiercely free print media has emerged strongly in this country during the 
last decade and attempts made by successive governments to muzzle its worst critics have 
proved to be largely unsuccessful. The exception is the Radio and TV but the satellite dishes 
have opened up the vista for alternative sources such as CNN and BBC. 
The other positive achievement has been the growth in the activities and coverage of 
the non-governmental organisations and advocacy groups for human rights, women rights, 
labour rights and environmental protection. The opening up of education and health services 
to the private sector and the NGOs has created some high quality institutions in this country 
but their access to the poor and disadvantaged groups remains limited. The market test 
revealed through employment and admissions to higher learning institutions has proved to 
be more potent in differentiating the good from the bad. In the realm of serving the poor 
some organisation such as AKRSP and Orangi project have won international acclaim. 
Accountability Ordinance drafted by the Interim government in 1996 was a good 
beginning in setting up an impartial, bipartisan and credible process of holding the public 
office holders accountable for their actions and deeds. This coupled with the “Freedom of 
Information Act” and elimination of “Official Secrets Act” in its present form can put in 
place elements which would promote transparency in decision-making. But unfortunately 
the subsequent developments have raised doubts about the neutrality and efficacy of the 
accountability process in the country.  
 
(ii) Political Stability and Violence 
It has been more than 11 years that the democratic form of government has 
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has been a far cry from a politically stable and predictable form of transfer of power. 
None of the elected government was allowed to complete the normal term of office. We 
have witnessed eight different Prime Ministers and four general elections since 1988. 
Although the legacies of the Martial Law induced constitutional provisions such as the 
Eighth amendment and the extraordinary influence of the President and the Chief of 
Army Staff have been eliminated recently the debate about the countervailing forces 
under the constitution has not died down. The yearning for removing elected 
governments before completing their full term of office has assumed almost a manic 
proportion among our intelligentsia and chattering classes. It is very rare that the 
rumours and speculations about the change in the government do not start flying around 
soon after the first year of completion of the office. These rumours and speculations 
prove to be self-fulfilling prophecy. Business confidence begins to deteriorate, new 
investment dries up, growth falters and economic conditions become more tough. The 
situation is not helped by the successive governments which have displayed either 
ineptness or incompetence or indulged in large scale corruption. The cycle of political 
instability is accompanied by macroeconomic instability. The international financial 
institutions (IFIs) are called in to help restore macroeconomic stability. As Pakistan’s 
past track record in implementing the agreed policy measures has been anything but 
stellar the IFIs insist upon up-front actions before tranche releases which do not always 
bring kudos to the political leaders. The tension between the urge to pursue populist 
policies and the compulsion to stick to the agreements reached with the IFIs leads to 
inconsistent and at times confusing signals. Neither the public-at-large is pleased nor the 
IFIs are happy at these outcomes. We lose credibility in the eyes of both the domestic 
constituency as well as international financiers. This cycle is repeated with every 
change in the government with the threshold of bearing pain becoming lower and lower 
while the doses of pain-inflicting medicines becoming stronger and stronger over time. 
Thus, our political instability in so far as it impinges upon macroeconomic stability 
Pakistan scores low over time, in comparison to our initial expectations and in relation 
to other countries. 
On the other component i.e. violence, our record in the past several years has 
been worrisome. Although the external factors such as the Afghan war had a major role 
to play, the ethnic tensions, religious divisiveness and sectarian intolerance have raised 
their ugly spectre in the country. The score on this dimension is low on all three 
yardsticks. 
 
(iii)  Government Effectiveness 
A view which is commonly shared by different sections of the population has to 
do with the effectiveness of government. Both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former 
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antiquated and exploitative system’ prevailing in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the actions 
taken by the political leadership to correct the system’s deficiencies has in fact 
contributed further to its ineffectiveness. By appointing their favourites to key positions, 
ignoring seniority and merit-based promotions, inducting  outsiders with little or no 
expertise or competence, purging civil servants without due legal process, allowing 
corruption and sycophancy to flourish, discouraging dissenting views, debates and 
thorough professional analysis of issues and failing to enforce standards of 
accountability the political rulers from successive regimes have created a culture of fear, 
apathy, indifference, inertia and lack of initiative among the bureaucracy. The well 
intentioned political leaders are understandably frustrated that their manifestos and   
commitments to the general public are seldom implemented. The majority of the 
bureaucrats, on the other hand, have seen so many arbitrary acts of retribution with 
every change of government that they avoid any acts of commission. It is argued that 
nobody is ever punished for acts of omission but our history is replete with the sacking 
of those who took initiative and actions in larger public interest. These actions were 
soon transformed to benefit narrow personal interests. The catch phrase among the 
honest bureaucrats is ‘lie low’ and ‘don’t create any waves’ while the dishonest among 
them are more than willing to work hard when their personal interests converge with 
those of their political masters. Under this kind of set up the loser is the ordinary citizen 
who is deprived of the access to basic services due to ineffectiveness and indifference of 
government functionaries. 
As a result of the above dynamics bureaucratic quality has declined over time 
and is at the lower end of the scale because the civil service structure and incentive 
system have not kept pace with the changing political and social developments of the 
last two decades. Moreover, objective standards of accountability of civil service have 
eroded and become highly diffused and unclear. 
The other worrisome trend is that instead of devolving power to the lower tiers 
of government and decentralising functions closer to the ultimate beneficiaries there 
have been tendencies for concentration of powers in the hands of the Chief Executives 
at the federal and the provincial levels. 
I don’t think it will be very controversial if we give a very low score to 
government effectiveness over time, in comparison to our expectations. This indicator 
will not improve unless civil service reform is implemented in serious earnestness 
including better pay structure. I think that there is not much difference among the 
countries in South Asia on government effectiveness. 
 
(iv) Regulatory Burden 
A study of the regulatory burden carried out in the 1980s had revealed that the 
number of government agencies and departments a medium sized enterprise had to 
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activities ranging from acquiring a piece of state land to obtaining permission to 
build, import and install machinery and equipment, obtain financing, get electricity, 
water, gas connections, employ labour, procure domestic raw materials and inputs, 
produce goods, pay taxes, cesses and charges and sell these goods in domestic or 
foreign markets. Since then there has been, on paper, some deregulation which has 
reduced a number of steps but the writ of the federal, provincial and local 
governments still looms large in practice. Increased harassment and extortion by the 
officials of various agencies and departments have increased the cost of doing 
business honestly and deterred new investment in the country. The unscrupulous 
businesses, in connivance with corrupt bureaucrats, can take all kinds of liberties 
with the laws, rules and regulations in force—understate income and profits, evade 
tax payments, under invoice exports, misclassify imports etc. On the other hand, 
where regulation is necessary to provide safety to consumers, protect health or 
environment in which we live there is complete laxity in enforcement and 
compliance. The result is that drinking water is contaminated, drugs are spurious, 
food is adulterated, piles of garbage can be seen everywhere, neighbourhoods are full 
of filth, traffic movement is hazardous and crime and violence are rampant. It is 
common knowledge that the regulators themselves—police officials—own a sizeable 
fleet of public transport which operate without let or hindrance. This conflict of 
interest between the “regulator” and the “regulated” is hardly noticed. 
One of the main factors, responsible for this divergence between 
deregulation on paper and excessive regulation in practice lies in the information 
asymmetry between the regulator and everyone else affected by those regulations. 
The nature, extend and coverage of regulation is known to the regulators only and 
this information is seldom available to the businesses and individuals subject to 
these regulations. Those in charge of enforcing these regulations can misrepresent 
the facts, misinterpret the laws and misguide their superiors without any fear of 
reprisal. The recourse for obtaining redress is either too time consuming and 
expensive or too loaded in favour of the officials that the whole façade of 
administrative reviews, appeals etc. is neither credible nor does it make any 
difference. 
There are some positive improvements e.g. price and wage controls are no 
longer as binding as they used to be in the past and are non-existent on most private 
goods. Support prices for main food staples are maintained. Black market premium 
on exchange rate has narrowed since the unification of the four rates that prevailed 
until May 1999. The conversion rates on foreign currency deposits are now closer to 
the market rates. Trade policy is moving in the right direction with lowering of tariff 
rates and reduction in the dispersal but Statutory Regulatory Orders are issued 
selectively to favour certain individuals and firms rather than applied across the 
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Overall, however, regulatory burdens is still misplaced; health, environmental 
protection, consumer safety, food and drug quality control which ought to be heavily 
regulated suffer from lax enforcement while the legitimate businesses have to bear 
the brunt of multiple taxes, cesses and extra-legal payments to avoid the heavy 
handed and arbitrary actions of various government agencies and departments. The 
situation is no different in other countries of the region. 
 
(v) Rule of Law 
The resumption of democratic rule had raised expectations that the judicial 
system will act as a strong countervailing force to the excesses or exuberant conduct of 
the Executive branch. Judicial institutions show a mixed and uneven trend with lower 
judiciary operating like the rest of the civil bureaucracy while the higher judiciary is 
overburdened and highly stressed. The high expectations from the public places further 
pressures on them. Although the performance of the higher judiciary has been variable 
during the last decade and confidence in the Supreme and High courts has waned and 
waxed there is still some hope that the judiciary will rise to the occasion whenever the 
situation will so warrant. There have been battles between the Executive and Judicial 
branches to delineate and define the respective boundaries and roles and scope under 
the constitution. But these bigger issues have been overtaken by the case overload, 
unnecessary delays in adjudication, shortage of judges and other structural factors 
which are confronted by an ordinary citizen in daily life. A confidence boosting 
measure will be the exemplary punishment of high ranking officials, businessmen and 
politicians of all parties found guilty by the Supreme and High courts including 
confiscation of illegally acquired property. 
The same level of trust and confidence is not held for the lower judiciary where 
allegations of all sorts ranging from payments made to readers and clerks for fixing the 
dates and influencing the outcomes to the lawyers acting as intermediaries on behalf of 
their “preferred” judges have become widespread. 
Private property rights have become insecure as the lower functionaries at the 
tehsil, municipal, development authority and registrar’s level and other record keeping 
organisations are found to tamper with the property records or abuse their positions to 
extort payments for performing their lawful duties i.e. to record the legal transactions. It 
can take an awful lot of time and huge expenses to undo the mischief done by these 
functionaries. 
The police department, the guardian of law and order, has not only become 
dysfunctional but also assumed the role of an intimidating outlaw who is feared by the 
neighbourhood by everyone except those providing protection to him. The elected 
members of the Assembly are reported to have threatened to resign from their parties if 
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(vi) Corruption 
A whole cottage industry has spawned for rating and ranking countries according 
to the perceptions of corruption. Although most of these publicly known indices suffer 
from a number of deficiencies and are neither precise nor robust they do offer a rough 
and approximate guide for cross country comparisons of incidence of corruption as 
perceived by businessmen. Transparency International Index published annually is the 
most oft quoted source for this purpose and Pakistan was named as the second most 
corrupt country in 1996. The relative ranking has improved during the last two years but 
we are still perceived to be among the top ten corrupt countries in the world. 
This externally designed indicator finds resonance internally where both anecdotal 
evidence as well as the dismissals of four elected Prime Ministers on charges of 
corruption, misuse of office etc. provide powerful corroboration to this finding. Since 
1997, a number of criminal cases against highest ranking officials of the previous ruling 
party have been field in the courts of law on specific charges of corruption. Some of these 
cases are still sub-judice and have not completed the full process of appeal and review 
but the number of indictments is highly revealing. But overall, the incidence of 
corruption is widespread, has risen over time and is now proving an impediment to the 
country’s development. There has been an ascendancy of private interests in the business 
of the state by those wielding authority and power and countervailing forces have 
become ineffective. 
In an earlier article
16 I have identified the major sources and channels of 
corruption in Pakistan. These are: (a) large scale evasion of taxes and leakages in the 
assessment (b) kickbacks in government purchases and contracts (c) contrived losses in 
public enterprises and public utilities (d) politically motivated loans by banks and 
financial institutions (e) nepotism, favouritism and sale of posts in government 
departments particularly law enforcing agencies and (f) discretionary used in award of 
licences, plots etc. 
We would decompose corruption in Pakistan in its various dimensions; (a) bribery 
and extortion in which two parties are involved (b) fraud and embezzlement which an 
official can carry out alone (c) evasion of taxes and other payments due by the private 
sector by misreporting and concealing (d) rents from import licencing, industrial 
sanctions, preferential credit or foreign exchange, selective subsidies etc. 
It must be conceded that there is hardly any country in the world where corruption 
has been eradicated or eliminated. The best we can expect is that the incidence and 
intensity and thus the inimical effects of corruption will be minimised over time. 
In my view there has been an upsurge in components a and c over time in 
Pakistan. Fraud and embezzlement might have shifted from public to private sector as  
 
 
16Ishrat Husain, “Six Tentacles of Corruption”, DAWN, Karachi, November 21, 1998. Institutions and Governance  527 
many activities are privatised and the oversight is either weak or collusive. In regard to 
(d) the rent seeking opportunities have certainly become much limited as a result of 
liberalisation but new opportunities are constantly sought. 
 
Which are the Institutions that Can Improve Governance in Pakistan? 
A complete schematic representation of the institutions of restraint is provided 
in Table 4 below. These are basically the domestic institutions. The external 
institutions of restraint which have perceived to have played a powerful role in case 
of Pakistan during the last ten years in particular have been the IMF and the World 
Bank. Pakistan has negotiated the highest number of agreements with the IMF among 
all the developing countries but the performance record has been unimpressive. I 
have argued in an earlier paper 18 that contrary to popular beliefs and conventional 
wisdom the agencies of external restraint cannot substitute for domestic oversight 
and are hardly capable of bringing about any long lasting fundamental changes in the 
economic governance of the country on their own. On the contrary, both the political 
leaders of all persuasions and the intelligentsia in the country are publicly articulating 
the view that these agencies have reduced the decision-making autonomy internally 
and created a constrained environment for action. Under these circumstances it 
would be unrealistic to pin any hope on any external agency for influencing the 
governance agenda of Pakistan in absence of a clear consensus within the country 
and broad based domestic ownership. 
The institutions of restraint in Pakistan can be classified into two broad 
categories: (a) Formal and (b) Informal. Under the former there are two distinct 
classes (i) State-centred and (ii) Civil society-centred. Historically, the emphasis has 
been on State-centred institutions although they have failed to act as effective 
countervailing forces against the abuse and misuse of power by the Executive organ. 
It is only recently that the Civil society-centred institutions such as the media and 
NGOs have begun to assert themselves. But these institutions have to undergo 
serious self evaluation to purge themselves of undesirable elements. Only then they 
can become effective and credible in performing the functions of watchdog, 
monitoring and oversight. 
Trust, social capital and civic norms have eroded gradually in Pakistan during 
the last several decades. Mistrust, suspicion and divisiveness have taken strong hold. 
These attributes can be strengthened if there is genuine decentralisation and devolution 
of responsibilities to the lower tiers of government but more important through greater 
involvement of the communities in the decision-making process in matters which affect 
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Table 4 
Institutions of Restraint in Pakistan (Spheres of Influence/Restraint) 
FORMAL   
A.  State Centred   
•  Judiciary  Protection of Basic Human Rights, Security 
of Life and Property, Contract Enforcement 
•  Parliamentary Committees/Public 
Accounts Committee 
Avoiding misuse and abuse of discretionary 
powers of the Executive branch 
•  Auditor General  Detection and reporting of financial 
irregularities in public accounts 
•  Ombudsman  Redressal of grievances of citizens against 
the excesses of public sector agencies 
•  Public Service Commission  Transparency in appointments and 
promotions to Civil services 
•  State Bank of Pakistan  Probity, supervision and regulation of the 
financial institutions 
•  Federal Election Commission  Screening of candidates for the elected 
public offices on the basis of  integrity 
•  Securities and Exchange Commission  Ensuring high standards of Corporate 
governance in publicly listed companies  
B. Civil Society-centred   
•  Media  Investigating and reporting of instances of 
corrupt practices in the country 
•  Non-governmental Organisations  Monitoring and advocacy of Governance 
issues and participation in delivery of social 
services 
•  Academic Institutions/Think Tanks  Research and analysis of the performance of 
the state organs, media and NGOs 
•  Professional Organisations  Providing inputs into a participatory 
decision-making process 
•  Private Sector Organisations  Regulating code of ethics among the private 
sector 
•  Religious Bodies  Building trust and harmony among various 
groups of society 
INFORMAL   
•  Trust   
•  Social Capital   
•  Civic Norms   Institutions and Governance  529 
Among the state-centred institutions the judiciary is at a much higher plane 
than any other institution and underpins the whole system of accountability. In 
addition to judiciary, there are at least seven institutions, which can make the 
difference? First, is the Parliamentary committees particularly the Public Accounts 
Committee. Bipartisan committees chaired by respected and qualified MNAs or 
Senators and staffed by full time professional and technical personnel should hold 
regular hearings, confirm the appointments of those heading these institutions, 
receive annual reports of performance, question the reported irregularities and 
recommend action against those found prima facie responsible for wrong doings. The 
recent work of the PAC shows that timely deliberation and follow up are of essence 
if the Committee has to acquire biting teeth. All procurement contracts above a 
certain financial limit, all fiscal exemptions and concessions, modifications to the 
SROs should be placed before the PAC. The proceedings of these Committees 
should be open to public and the media. The temptation for the members of these 
committees to harass or intimidate the concerned officials or get involved in micro 
management is very strong under the political culture of Pakistan. If this happens 
these committees will be more of a nuisance than an agent of good governance. 
Second, is the State Bank of Pakistan. An independent and autonomous State 
Bank provides a guarantee against the excessive and irresponsible actions of the 
politicians and the bureaucrats in economic management. The federal and provincial 
governments will be guarded in their spending decisions if the State Bank refuses to 
honour their cheques beyond the given Ways and Means limits. At the same time the 
regulatory and supervision functions of the State Bank act as a safeguard against the 
possible malpractices in the award of credit and recovery of loans. It must be 
recognised that there has already been significant improvement in the working of the 
State Bank since it was granted autonomy. 
Third, is the Auditor General of Pakistan. The constitutional protection given 
to the office of the AG has not been fully utilised in Pakistan to unearth and detect 
financial bungling rampant in the public sector agencies. The extended time lapse 
between the occurrence of the financial irregularity and the actual detection and 
reporting by the Auditors has improved in recent years. But the lack of professional 
expertise and lack of prioritisation among core and peripheral cases still mute the 
efficacy of this office. The AG should commission third party audits by professional 
firms of repute, use the broader ‘value for money’ concept and enlarge its scope of 
activities to cover all major public sector commercial and industrial enterprises 
particularly WAPDA/KESC, Sui Northern/Southern, Railways, Steel Mill, OGDC, 
PIA etc. 
Fourth, is the Securities and Exchange Commission. Capital markets in 
Pakistan are highly shallow and have not played an effective role in intermediation 
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companies is weak and dominated by major family shareholders with due regard to 
the right of minority shareholders. Insider trading is perceived to be widely rampant 
and disclosure of information standards are loosely enforced. The recent 
strengthening of the SEC is a step in the right direction but it needs operational 
autonomy, resources and skills to carry out its mandate. It has hardly begun the task 
of dealing with unscrupulous companies which have raised public funds but failed to 
perform their duties and obligations towards those who have contributed these funds. 
Fifth is the Federal/Provincial Public Service Commissions. Most of the 
current difficulties in governance have arisen due to the politicisation of the higher 
services in the post-1973 period. There is a general recognition that the merit based 
system of recruitment, appointments and promotions, despite many shortcomings had 
served the nation better than the present sifarish based and buy-the-post system. The 
responsibilities for all recruitment and promotions should be reverted to the 
Commissions without any exception but only men and women of proven integrity 
and impeccable credentials should be appointed as Chairman and members of the 
Commission. There is no harm in appointing retired officials or judges but these 
appointments should not be a reward for loyalty to the party in power or for favours 
shown to the authorities. The Police Commissions should also be set up on the same 
lines. 
Sixth, is the Federal/Provincial Ombudsman. The fanfare with which these 
offices were established under the Zia Government died down fairly quickly. They 
are now perceived to be grinding the same millstone as the rest of the bureaucracy. In 
fact, they can become an effective instrument for quick, fair and judicious redress of 
the grievances of the common citizens against the arbitrary harassment of the 
overzealous or corrupt officials. There are very few people who are aware of the 
scope and mandate of this office and who have trust in the organisation. A proactive 
educational role, a demonstration effect of its reach accompanied by selection of the 
right persons to the job can make it work. 
Seventh is the Federal Election Commission. A powerful, independent and 
assertive FEC can play a preventive role by careful screening, scrutiny and 
investigation of the candidates for all tiers of elected offices and disqualifying those 
who are ill reputed and of dubious character. They should forcefully enforce the 
criteria prescribed under the Constitution augmented by appropriate rules and 
regulations. This fundamental shift in the quality of our elected public officials would 
bring about a significant change in the overall structure of governance in the country. 
 
How can these Institutions of Restraint be Strengthened? 
There are certain pre-conditions under which these institutions of restraint can be 
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countervailing forces such as the Parliament, Judiciary, Press and the Civil society 
organisations are allowed to play an independent role. If they are made subservient or 
repressed nothing worthwhile will happen. There should be no presumption that any 
one entity whether it is the executive or the judiciary or the media or civil society will 
enjoy monopoly power or act as a self righteous body of vigilance. It is the interaction 
of these various entities which will generate the optimal results. Second, we are not 
proposing any new institutions but arguing for the revitalisation, revamping and re-
engineering of those already existing under the constitution. There is a common 
tendency and an easy way out for both national governments and international donors to 
abandon the existing institutions and create new agencies which start out with a big 
bang but soon fall in the same whirlpool of inaction and ineptitude. The reasons for 
their failure are precisely the same as those which explain the non-performance of the 
existing institutions. Unless the underlying dynamics is set right the institutional morass 
will continue to grow. The history of Pakistan is laden with creation of a whole plethora 
of new institutions which have been given fuzzy mandate, inadequate resources, little 
operational autonomy and are never held accountable for results. Finally, this proposal 
does not favour the periodic, swift, abrupt, highly visible and publicised, extra-
institutional measures against recalcritant officials which has been the norm in Pakistan 
since the 1958 screening of senior civil servants done by Ayub Khan. The subsequent 
actions by successive Governments resorting to the purging of 303 or 1500 civil 
servants have paradoxically created greater insecurity, uncertainty and unpredictability 
which are the breeding grounds for increased corruption. The recent handling of the 
IPPs has done more harm to foreign private investment flows rather than taken the 
corrupt among them to task. 
The approach advocated in this article is to create an environment whereby the 
acts of misdemeanour and malfeasance are exposed routinely, increased vigilance and 
scrutiny is exercised continuously, early detection, investigation and fixing of 
responsibility are carried out resolutely and disciplinary actions against those found 
guilty are taken promptly. Such an environment would act as a more effective deterrent 
in curbing corrupt practices than creating many laws and anti-corruption agencies with 
enormous powers which are misused. This approach will not work if the federal and 
provincial investigation agencies are not organised on modern and professional lines. It 
will also be difficult to implement it if the government does not do away with the 
widespread and mindless application of the Official Secrets Act which has given shelter 
to the opacity of decision-making by the politicians and the civil servants. Outside the 
matters of national defence and internal security all decisions particularly in matters of 
public finance, foreign trade, contract awards and allocation of other public resources 
should be wholly transparent and made public. 
These seven pillars of good governance can together make the difference 
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known integrity (we have many of them in the country) (b) the terms of reference, 
responsibilities, functions and powers of these institutions are clearly defined (c) there is 
no political interference in their working but at the same time they are held publicly 
accountable for their actions and the results (d) they are provided adequate financial 
resources and professional staff of caliber (e) they follow open and transparent 
procedures and processes. 
The question that arises is: Why are these seven institutions not working 
effectively? Why should we expect them to perform differently? The five elements 
identified above are missing in most of these institutions and if we do have, by 
coincidence or design, the combination of these elements in place the results are simply 
outstanding. PIA under Noor Khan and Asghar Khan and the PIDC under Ghulam 
Faruq are the examples which come readily to mind as the best practices of this model. 
If the present leadership is indeed committed to this concept the model outlined above 
can be applied in practice. 
Together, these seven pillars, if allowed to work effectively, will be able to plug 
in some of the conduits that lead to corrupt practices. The most difficult question to 
answer is: Who will bell the cat? Who has the courage and guts to put these changes in 
place? Of course, an enlightened government which has a sense of history rather than 
sights fixed at the next elections is the only one capable of doing it. Pakistan has not 







Ishrat Husain begins with an elaborate statement about governance and 
institutions, their definitions and relationships. He divides public sector functions 
into three categories, namely, policy-making, service delivery, and oversight and 
accountability, and focuses on the last. On the way to his recommendations he is 
tempted to dilate on a number of questions, viz., 
  1.  Why do institutions matter? 
  2.  How do we measure governance? 
  3.  How does governance measure up in Pakistan? 
  4. Which institutions can make a difference in improving governance in 
Pakistan? 
His major thrust is on the identification of institutions of restraint, and on how 
these can be strengthened. 
He then takes us on a quick tour of A Alesina’s survey of literature on 
“political economy of high and low growth” and talks about his “four sets of political 
institutional variables” which pertain to (a) the quality of government, including 
measures for corruption, (b) property rights and enforcement of contracts, (c) 
democracy, and (d) such socio-economic characteristics as income inequality and 
ethnic and religious factors. This leads to the propositions (i) that good  institutions 
facilitate growth and that political instability and fragility undermine investors’ 
confidence, (ii) that bureaucratic quality determines the success or otherwise of 
national economies, and (iii) that corruption not only reduces private investment but 
also worsens the composition of public expenditure. 
He refers to six clusters of governance indicators grouped under the following 
three categories: (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and 
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them. 
Husain’s moves on to attempt a balance-sheet of accomplishments and 
failures in the area of governance and institutional development in Pakistan with the 
aid of Kaufman’s aggregate indicators and arrives at the well-known conclusion that 
“the current state of governance and institutional development is fairly weak”. 
Husain’s substantial contribution relates to his two sets of institutions of 
restraint in Pakistan which he neatly places under the heads, Formal and Informal, 
i.e., State-centred and Civil Society-centred. His major concern remains the abuse 
and misuse of power by the Executive organs. He understands that the media and the Inayatullah  534
NGOs at present are not strong enough as they suffer from internal weaknesses, 
while Trust, Social Capital, and Civic Norms have gradually “evaporated” in 
Pakistan. These, he thinks, can be built up through “decentralisation and devolution” 
and greater involvement of the communities in the decision-making process. His list 
of Institutions of Restraint is: 
  1.  Parliamentary Committees, particularly the Public Accounts Committee; 
  2.  State Bank of Pakistan; 
  3.  Auditor-General of Pakistan; 
  4.  Securities and Exchange Commission; 
  5.  Federal/Provincial Public Service Commissions; 
 6.  Federal/Provincial  Ombudsman; 
  7.  Federal Election Commission. 
Little is said about the judiciary although it is admitted in the paper that it 
“underpins the whole system of accountability”. The crux of Husain’s contribution is 
the last two pages of his paper. 
His seven-pillar institutions, he says, can succeed only if countervailing forces 
such as the Parliament, Judiciary, Press, and Civil Society Organisations are allowed 
to play an independent role; further, it is the interaction of these various entities 
which will generate the optimum results. He makes another perceptive statement that 
ad hoc, abrupt, and extra-institutional measures like the purging of civil services can 
be counter-productive. He is for the creation of an environment where misdemeanour 
and malfeasance are exposed and dealt with as a matter of course, investigative 
agencies are organised on professional lines, and decision-making is wholly 
transparent and is made public. 
Husain further makes his “pillars of good governance” conditional on (a) the 
appointment of strong and competent managers of known integrity, (b) clear terms of 
reference, (c) provision of adequate financial resources, and (d) the practice of 
transparent process and procedures. 
He refers to one more condition—that there is “no political interference” in 
the working of these seven institutions. 
Here is the rub: “Who will bell the cat?” He pins his hope on “an enlightened 
government which has a sense of history rather than sights fixed at the next 
election”. And he concludes with the remark that Pakistan has not been forturate in 
having such a government so far. 
Husain’s paper seeks to suggest that his seven pillars could strengthen 
institutions and ensure accountability. This he underpins by reference to a number of 
prerequisites of good governance, and reasons why institutions fail and become 
dysfunctional. 
The weakness of the paper lies in the reference to a number of conditions 
without which his recipe will not work. Merely a mention of the conditions does not Comments  535
do justice to the subject of the paper. Husain skirts past what he calls “the underlying 
dynamic” which has to be set right and without which “the institutional morass will 
continue to grow”. 
It is essentially the values of a semi-feudal society and the quasi-colonial 
character of our political culture which is responsible for the deficiencies and 
distortions in the exercise of power, decision-making, and implementation, and 
which in turn has infected the civil services and degraded the whole gamut of the 
governance apparatus. 
The question is: How can this culture undergo the desired change? And how 
can such a change be accelerated? 
While globalisation and external pressures of diverse kinds are bound to 
influence the society and shake it to shed the medieval ways of thinking and 
behaviour, it is essentially the political process within a country which provides the 
basis for a durable change. Initiatives like the rapid spread of literacy, modernisation 
of education, land reform, and population control are vital for the societal change, 
without which our representative governing institutions cannot undergo the 
transformation needed. The press and the judiciary as well as citizens’ organisations 
play a vital role in bringing about a change in the behaviour of individuals and 
institutions. Without such societal transformation, trust and rule of law will remain 
marginalised and no real and lasting improvement will take place. 
It is not good enough to identify the problems and the refer to the conditions 
preceding an application of remedies. Equal, if not more important, is the need to 
pinpoint the steps to bring about a societal shift in  thinking and behaviour, and to 
state how this can be brought about. 
It appears that Ishrat Husain wrote his paper before October 12. However, he 
presented it after the military take-over. There is much in the paper from which the 
reformist new regime can benefit in its quest to rebuild institutions and revamp 








The whole issue of governance seems to me just putting the state into the 
consideration of economic development, and as a political scientist, to me this is a good 
idea. Certainly, institutions matter, bureaucracy matters, corruption is a bad thing; and 
the seven pillars and institutions that the author suggests could add these as instruments 
of restraint, and maybe some other instruments, rather pillars, as well; all the things that 
are conducive undoubtedly to economic growth and development. For they also 
conduce to things like responsiveness to citizens and the accountability of 
government—so building on trust, the broader functions of what government do, as 
well as the rather narrow functions of economic development. So, that is one comment. 
Another comment I wanted to make relates to the ills of rapid change of governments. It 
would be destabalising for development: nine prime ministers for that matter, nine 
governmental changes, since 1988. I would suggest that the real issue is not the rapidly 
changing governments, but rather the changes in the constitutional system. Since 1973 
there have  been what could be called by political scientists six different constitutional 
systems in a state. You have a constitutional system that exists from 1973 to 1977, the 
unrevised 1973 Constitution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Then, the period of Martial Law 
from 1977 to 1985 with Zia. You have then the period from 1985 to 1989, of the guided 
democracy. Then you have the period following Zia’s death in which there was 
development of a democratic system, a messy democratic system. All democratic 
systems, I think, are messy. But the system which you have, you have a representation 
of the Prime Minister, the President, the Judiciary, and perhaps other forces, the 
establishment perhaps; all, in a sense, having their own best play in that developing 
system. And you have successions of government, and rather relatively rapid 
successions of government, i.e., change of governments. You had accountability at a 
higher level, as a consequence of the system. And then in 1997, a really new 
constitutional system came into effect when the 8th amendment [of the Constitution] 
was passed and which insulated the elected government from any, perhaps any 
functional possibility of being removed from office. And then, of course, we have had 
the recent advancement in October, another constitutional system. So I would suggest 
that one of the true impediments to economic development in the state has been simply 
changing the constitutional worlds too often. For the pillars that have been suggested to 
be effective, these worlds have to remain constant. 
 
Charles H. Kennedy 
Wake Forest University, 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 
USA. 
*The above comments are the edited version of an oral presentation by the commentator as 
transcribed from an audio recording of the session. 